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Abstract
Vulnerabilities in software programs made possible
the widespread and frequent occurrence of malware out-
breaks. Extensive research has been devoted to detec-
tion and prevention of control hijacking attacks due to
their prevalence. The non-control data attacks are not
yet so prevalent, but, as more and more avenues are
closed for the malicious software authors they will gain
in popularity.
Our paper presents a defense mechanism against
non-control data attacks. The solution we propose is to
store security sensitive data in a special protected stor-
age. The programmer is responsible to mark data ap-
propriately using our C language extension. The mem-
ory pages where security critical data is allocated are
marked as read-only. Updates of this data are allowed
only in special marked sections and the compiler will
generate the function calls necessary to change the per-
missions to memory pages.
Our solution oﬀers strong security guaranties by not
allowing any writes of protected data with the excep-
tion of very short intervals. This defense must be used
together with a defense against control data attacks,
which prevents attacks like code injection, return-to-
libc. More general the control data attack must pre-
vent system calls to be injected and system calls to be
skipped.
1 Introduction
The most popular avenue exploited by malware au-
thors is to pervert normal execution ﬂow. Usually, this
is achieved by corrupting some control sensitive data
like return address, function pointers, C++ virtual
function table. Numerous defenses have been proposed
and some of them are already included in latest Linux
distributions [6, 8, 12, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 4, 7, 17].
Once the defenses against control data attacks will be
in place, the malware authors will have to ﬁnd diﬀer-
ent means of attack. Chen et. al. [9] proved the
exploits corrupting non-control data are equally dan-
gerous. They presented attacks against popular soft-
ware applications which resulted in gaining a root shell
on the victim computer.
Non-control data attacks lack a clear deﬁnition.
Usually they are presented as the attacks succeeding
without corrupting control sensitive data. Chen et. al
[9] identify a few categories of data that can be used in
a successful attack against real life applications.
One example is conﬁguration parameters like loca-
tion of data and executable ﬁles, access control policies.
Another category isuser identity data. The appli-
cations requiring user authentication before granting
access to the service usually keep this information in
memory. An attacker can change this data after au-
thentication and before it is used. For example, the
user id can be changed to grant administrator level.
User input string is another type of data attack. The
input from the user is ﬁrst validated by the application,
while still buﬀered it is altered to become malicious.
Finally, the last category of non-control data attacks
presented isdecision-making data. This attack is based
on the assumption that some boolean value is used
in a conditional branch after a multi-step authentica-
tion. Corrupting this value renders the previous steps
useless. The authors proposed for this data the name
security-critical data.
We identiﬁed as a common characteristic of the at-
tacks proposed by Chen et. al [9], data is initialized
correctly but modiﬁed before it’s use. We propose a
solution to protect the data after initialization. Our so-
lution is intended to prevent non-control data attacks
only and it should be use in conjunction with other de-
fense for control data attacks like control ﬂow integrity
[5]. The control data attacks defense must prevent sys-
tem call injection and to prevent a system call to be
skipped.
Our approach is to keep security-critical data struc-
tures in memory pages marked as read-only to prevent
unauthorized changes. The implementation needs op-
1erating system support like access rights on memory
pages, system calls to set and modify the access rights.
In addition, we propose a language extension to mark
the security critical data and specify the authorized
modiﬁcations it. Furthermore, we need to extend the
compiler to manage the storage holding security critical
data and to generate the necessary system calls.
The memory layout of the applications compiled
with our modiﬁed compile contains a segment for the
static data marked as security critical. In addition, a
part of the heap will be reserved for dynamically allo-
cated data. We propose a library functions to allocate
and free memory in this part of the heap. We chose
this solution to allow both protection of address and
the allocated data. We will identify the both mem-
ory segments by secure storage. We will refer to the
existing data memory as regular storage.
The additions to the programming language are a
type qualiﬁer (critical) and a statement (criticalup-
date). The type qualiﬁer is an indication to the com-
piler to allocate the space for the variables in the se-
cure storage. The newly introduced statement allows
changes to be propagated to the secure storage. If
changes are attempted outside a criticalupdate block,
an error will occur. Details about proposed implemen-
tations and semantics of the statement will follow in
section 3.1.
The defense we propose provides strong security
guaranties by protecting the data against unauthorized
modiﬁcations. The memory can not be written outside
the security critical section and the policy is enforced
by the operating system. Because this defense is used
in conjunction with an additional defense against con-
trol data attack, the attacker is unable to make a sys-
tem call to change the access rights on the secure stor-
age. We acknowledge that any security ﬂaw or limita-
tions in the defense against control data attacks renders
our defense useless. However, if that is the case, we be-
lieve the attacker would choose the a well known data
control attack to exploit the vulnerability.
An arguably disadvantage of our approach is it re-
quires a human to mark the security critical data and
the blocks where changes to this data are allowed. We
propose an additional inference tool that can be used
identify security critical data. However, the program-
mer is responsible to identify sections where the data
is legitimately modiﬁed. An argument in favor of this
human intervention is good is that the programmers
are made aware of security issues. A programmer is
not necessarily less smart if she ignores the security as-
pects as long as she is not educated to consider them.
Programmer awareness is necessary even in the pres-
ence of the most sophisticated tools.
A deﬁnite disadvantage is the intervals needed to
update the secure storage. We propose in section 3.2
solutions to minimize this time. The most secure of the
solutions proposed, oﬀers the possibility to the pro-
grammer to specify the memory locations to be up-
dated. A copy of this memory is done in the regular
storage. All the changes are performed on the copy. At
the end of the criticalupdate section the copy is stored
back. The secure storage is vulnerable only when the
data is transferred back. Furthermore, to prevent race
conditions, the memory page can not be accessed, not
even for read accesses.
The solution as presented by now, seems to oﬀer
only prevention of memory corruption attacks. The
operating system signals when an attempt is made to
update a read-only memory page. The causes of such
an event can be an application error or an unautho-
rized attempt to modify the memory. We are unable
to distinguish between the two possibilities. However,
when the application is in the deployment phase the
number of application errors is low, and a attempt to
write in the secure storage is very likely to be caused
by an attack. We plan to extend the current solution
oﬀer support for capturing the attack payload.
Performance penalty on the overall program is
strongly dependent on how many variables need to be
protected. Read and write accesses to security critical
data have a huge performance penalty.
Security critical data needs special handling even for
read accesses. If the cache does not oﬀer a protection
bit to disallow writing then the security critical data
can not be cached.
The write accesses suﬀer from even greater penalty
due to the system calls needed to change the mem-
ory protection. However, we estimate the number of
memory accesses and the number of security critical
variables is small. The performance penalty relative to
the running time should be low.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes previous research on detection and
prevention of memory corruption attacks. In section
3 we present our solution in detail. Next, in section
4 we will evaluate of our solution. In section 5 we
describe the current status of implementation. Next
we will present plans for a full implementation in the
section 6. Finally we will present our conclusions in
section 7.
22 Background
Protection against memory corruption attacks has
been an active area of research in the last few years.
The ﬁrst defenses proposed targeted the most popular
attacks, stack smashing using buﬀer overﬂow [23, 19].
ProPolice [1] saves a canary value on the stack at en-
try point and at exit point code is inserted to verify if
the value saved at entry point has been modiﬁed. If
there is a diﬀerence the execution is aborted. An addi-
tional feature of ProPolice [1] is the copy of the func-
tion parameters into local variables with order random-
ized. Stack Guard [13] is a similar defense proposed
by Cowan et. all. This defense is vulnerable to heap
overﬂow, any code injection attacks not using stack,
return-to-libc attacks.
A diﬀerent approach is libsafe [2]. A new parameter
is added to the unsafe library functions like strcpy to
specify the array limit. Unfortunately, this defense has
not been used in practice and does not protect against
attacks not using buﬀer overﬂows. A more general so-
lution for memory safety is proposed by Necula et. all
[20]. The goal is to enforce a strong typed system by
static or runtime checks.
Shadow stack [10] is another defense against stack
smashing attacks. This is a hardware solution. A
shadow stack of return addresses is maintained and be-
fore each return the return address is checked against
the value in the shadow stack.
The defenses presented focus almost exclusively on
protecting the return address, or are limited to enforc-
ing a form of bounds checking. The applications are
still vulnerable to memory corruption attacks that al-
low the attacker to write at arbitrary memory address.
Format string exploit is an example of attack that
allows writing an arbitrary value to an arbitrary mem-
ory location. A defense has been proposed by Cowan
et. all [11]. Their solution is build a wrapper function
to printf to verify if the number of actual arguments is
the same as the number of variable arguments.
Another solution for buﬀer overﬂow was proposed
by Cowan et. all [12] which work by encrypting the
pointers. An attacker is able to modify the pointer,
but the value is unpredictable since she doesn’t know
the encryption key.
The next generation of defenses focus on a more gen-
eral class of attacks: attacks relying on code injection
and attacks based on a ﬁxed memory address.
Write or execute pages [4] prevent execution of code
altered by an attacker by not allowing updates of pages
marked as executable. This solution requires hardware
and operating system support. However, the system is
still vulnerable to attacks that use existing code, like
return-to-libc.
Instruction set randomization [17, 7] is another de-
fense against code injection attacks. The code is en-
crypted at compile or load time and decrypted before
execution. The code injected by attacker is not en-
crypted, but it is decrypted. The instructions resulted
after decryption are essentially random code and a
crash will occur soon. This defense does not protect the
system against return-to-libc attacks. This defense re-
lies on keeping the encryption key secret and use a sim-
ple encryption algorithm like XOR. An attacker needs
only one plaintext ciphertext pair to determine the key.
Even an attacker without access to the local machine is
able, under certain conditions, to remotely determine
the randomization key as shown by Sovarel et. all [22].
Kirovski et. all [18] proposed an intrusion preven-
tion defense. At install time a hash is computed for
each cache line. During execution, the hash is calcu-
lated and compared with the precalculated value.
Address space layout randomization [4] is a defense
breaking attacks relying a ﬁxed known memory ad-
dress by randomizing the starting address of program
segments. Shacham et. all [21] presented an attack
which determines the starting address of the libc text
segment.
Most modern defenses proposed cover a much larger
class of attacks and have a better deﬁned adversary
model. Abadi et. al. [5] proposed a defense which al-
low the software to follow only path from CFG prede-
termined ahead of time. However general, their defense
fails to protect against non-control data attacks.
Another important defense to prevent control hi-
jacking attacks is DIRA, proposed by Smirnov and Chi-
ueh [15]. Their approach is based on logs of memory
operations and periodically save of program execution
checkpoints. The detection relies on checking the con-
trol data structures against a shadow copy. When an
attack is detected, the application rolls back to the last
safe state and subsequent memory operations are un-
done. This approach fails too to protect against non-
control data attacks. The approach needs compiler and
runtime support.
Chen et. al. [9] are the ﬁrst to prove how dangerous
non-control data attacks are. Xu et. al [24] proposed a
defense for automatically diagnose and repair memory
corruption attacks. However their approach is based
on the assumption that a memory corruption will gen-
erate a crash. The application crash is use to trigger
diagnose and response. However a successful attack,
which doesn’t crash the application will be undetected.
Our approach has less ambitious goals, but we provide
guaranties that an attack which doesn’t crash the tar-
get application will be detected.
33 Solution Overview
The solution we propose to prevent non-control data
attacks is to keep the security critical data in a special
storage. The programmer is responsible to mark the
security critical data. In addition, the updates to the
security critical data must be performed in critical up-
dates sections. We will present the details in section
3.1.
A compiler extension handles the allocation of static
security-critical data in the secure storage, generate the
code to set the correct access rights to the secure stor-
age, generate the function calls to allow updates in the
critical updates sections. The section 3.2 contains the
description of the proposed compiler extension.
Section 3.3 presents the memory layout of an appli-
cation protected by our system.
In section 3.4 we present the necessary support from
the operating system to implement our system.
3.1 Language Extentions
A type qualiﬁer called critical has been added to
indicate the variable must be allocated in the secure
storage. To allow dynamically allocated security crit-
ical data we add a secure heap section and special li-
brary functions to allocate and free memory in it.
In Figure 1 we present the possible declarations:
• Static variable allocated in the secure storage
• The address in the secure storage, but the array
elements are stored in the unprotected storage
• The address in the regular storage, but the array
elements are stored in the secure storage
• Both the address and the array elements are stored
in the secure storage
critical int i;
critical int *pi =
malloc( n * sizeof(int) );
int *pi = secure_malloc( n * sizeof(int) );
critical int *pi =
secure_malloc( n * sizeof(int) );
Figure 1. Type Qualiﬁer Example
If the critical type qualiﬁer is used in a local vari-
able declaration, the semantic is diﬀerent. Instead of
allocating the variable on the stack it is allocated in
the secure storage. Figure 2 depicts the semantics.
We propose three possible implementations of crit-
ical update statement. First option is to allow any
Local variable declaration:
critical int i;
Equivalent declaration:
int *i = secure_malloc( sizeof(int) );
Figure 2. Type Qualiﬁer Example, Local Variable
writes to secure storage inside the criticalupdate block
(see Figure 3).
criticalupdate {
....
}
Generated Code:
toggle_protection();
....
toggle_protection();
Figure 3. Critical Update Statement
A more secure solution which limits the time when
the secure storage is vulnerable at the expense of dou-
bling the space needed for security critical data. For
each variable in the secure storage, a copy of it is kept
in the regular storage. The address of the shadow copy
is kept with the variable in the secure storage. Fur-
thermore, the data in the secure heap contains the size
of the allocated block.
Figure 4 presents this improved solution. First copy
call updates the shadow copy of the variable speciﬁed.
The updates will be performed on the shadow copy.
Next, access rights are changes, the shadow copy is
copied back in the secure storage, and the access rights
are changed back to read-only.
criticalupdate(x) {
....
}
Generated Code:
copy(x)
.....
toggle_protection();
copy_back(x)
toggle_protection();
Figure 4. Critical Update Statement
A more secure solution is to dynamically allocate
space in the regular storage, perform the changes on
the copy, and propagates the changes back to the se-
cure storage. This solution has a much smaller space
overhead. The time overhead is much larger due to the
extra calls to allocate the space for the shadow copy.
4The solution is more secure because the address of the
shadow copy used in update is diﬀerent at each execu-
tion.
Figure 5 presents this improved solution.
criticalupdate(x) {
....
}
Generated Code:
int x1 = copy(x)
..... // executed on x1
toggle_protection();
copy_back(x1,x)
toggle_protection();
Figure 5. Critical Update Statement
3.2 Compiler Support
The compiler has to be modiﬁed thoroughly to sup-
port the solution we propose.
First we have to modify the parser to accept the
language extensions.
The intermediate code generator has to support the
newly introduced statement. The necessary function
calls (copy, copyi back, toggle protection) must be in-
serted. Depending on the solution chosen, a variable
declaration should be introduced too.
The back end must be modiﬁed to generate the new
memory layout.
A library contains the system calls and secure heap
management function should be provided.
3.3 Memory Management
The memory layout of an application protected by
our system contains two extra segments. One segment
is dedicated to hold the static security critical data.
The second segment is used for the secure heap.
In the secure heap, space is allocated for data and
its size. The size precedes the data. For each block of n
bytes, n+4 bytes are allocated. The secure heap is just
another regular heap instance. The secure heap alloca-
tion methods are simple wrappers to allocate the space
for the size. To maintain the same semantic for point-
ers, allocation method returns a pointer to the data,
instead of a pointer to the beginning of the allocated
block.
3.4 Operating System Support
PaX [4] uses mprotect [3] to set the protection
for memory regions. PaX [4] guaranties a page con-
tain code can not be both writable and executable.
For our solution, the operating system must guaranty
that the memory protection for the secure storage is
set to PROT READ [3], and it is not writable, nor
executable.
In addition, the operating systems must provide the
possibility to lock the memory page during updates.
This is required to eliminate race conditions.
4 Evaluation
The solution we propose trades performance for se-
curity. We presented three approaches which oﬀer dif-
ferent levels of security.
4.1 Security
The most important security guaranty of our system
is that the security critical data is protected against
illegal changes no matter the avenue used by the at-
tacker. This is true for the entire time the execution
is outside a critical update statement. The three solu-
tion presented oﬀer diﬀerent security properties. The
most secure one, copies only the data structure modi-
ﬁed back and the secure storage is vulnerable only dur-
ing the copying.
The system we proposed relies on the programmer
to mark the security critical data. If the programmer
fails to do it, the application is vulnerable.
4.2 Performance
Performance has been the most important factor of
a system design and implementation. Lately, the trade
oﬀs between performance and security are accepted
when the loss of performance is acceptable. Our solu-
tion provides security and we estimate the performance
penalty to be low relative to the execution time.
First argument is that only a small number of vari-
ables are security critical.
Another argument is that read penalty should be
low and it’s determined by the impossibility to cache
the security critical data. This loss can be eliminated
if the cache oﬀers a protection bit to prevent writes to
security critical data cached.
The updates to security critical data are severely af-
fected. A simple write in the cache is replaced with at
least two system calls with the overhead of not only a
function call, but also context switches. The penalty
loss as a percent of execution time, should be very low
because writes are rare and the number of security crit-
ical variables is low.
55 Implementation
The implementation is made under Linux, Fedora
Core 3. The compiler we modiﬁed is gcc, version 4.1.0.
The language extended is C.
The implementation is still under development. The
goal for this semester was to have the language exten-
sions and compiler parts implemented. We built a set
of wrappers for the secure allocator and system calls
we need.
Unfortunately, our estimation was overly optimistic.
We changed radically the system design to oﬀer better
security. Another drawback was the compiler we chose.
The reason was that it is very well maintained and the
code is very clean, but it’s very big. We spent a lot of
time trying to understand the system.
We fully implemented the changes in front
end. The implementation is available at
http://sourceforge.net/projects/uvacs771. We added
a new type of node for the critical update statement.
Also we were able to introduce function calls in the
tree to generate the code needed for the second pro-
posed solution of implementation for critical update
statement.
We were unable, due to the time constraints, to im-
plement the backend changes to allocate the segments
correctly. This changes in the backend are needed be-
cause we modiﬁed the system design.
6 Future Work
We plan to continue to work on this project. First
step is to ﬁnish the compiler implementation. Second,
we have to add more details about the operating system
support. Finally, we have to ﬁnish the writing on the
paper.
7 Conclusion
The system we propose oﬀers an improved security
at the expense of performance. However, the perfor-
mance loss is negligible. The system can fail to protect
the application if it used improperly.
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